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Anomaly Extraction in Backbone Networks Using
Association Rules
Daniela Brauckhoff, Xenofontas Dimitropoulos, Arno Wagner, and Kavé Salamatian
Abstract—Anomaly extraction refers to automatically finding,
in a large set of flows observed during an anomalous time interval,
the flows associated with the anomalous event(s). It is important
for root-cause analysis, network forensics, attack mitigation, and
anomaly modeling. In this paper, we use meta-data provided by
several histogram-based detectors to identify suspicious flows, and
then apply association rule mining to find and summarize anoma-
lous flows. Using rich traffic data from a backbone network, we
show that our technique effectively finds the flows associated with
the anomalous event(s) in all studied cases. In addition, it triggers
a very small number of false positives, on average between 2 and
8.5, which exhibit specific patterns and can be trivially sorted out
by an administrator. Our anomaly extraction method significantly
reduces the work-hours needed for analyzing alarms, making
anomaly detection systems more practical.
Index Terms—Association rules, computer networks, data
mining, detection algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
A NOMALY detection techniques are the last line of de-fense when other approaches fail to detect security threats
or other problems. They have been extensively studied since
they pose a number of interesting research problems, involving
statistics, modeling, and efficient data structures. Nevertheless,
they have not yet gained widespread adaptation, as a number of
challenges, like reducing the number of false positives or sim-
plifying training and calibration, remain to be solved.
In this paper, we are interested in the problem of identifying
the traffic flows associated with an anomaly during a time in-
terval with an alarm. We call finding these flows the anomalous
flow extraction problem, or simply anomaly extraction. At the
high-level, anomaly extraction reflects the goal of gaining more
information about an anomaly alarm, which, without additional
meta-data, is often meaningless for the network operator. Identi-
fied anomalous flows can be used for a number of applications,
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Fig. 1. High-level goal of anomaly extraction is to filter and summarize the set
of anomalous flows that coincide with the flows caused by a network event such
as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks or scans.
like root-cause analysis of the event causing an anomaly, col-
lecting network forensics, improving anomaly detection accu-
racy, and modeling anomalies.
B. Anomaly Extraction
In Fig. 1, we present the high-level goal of anomaly extrac-
tion. In the bottom of the figure, events with a network-level
footprint, like attacks or failures, trigger event flows, which,
after analysis by an anomaly detector, may raise an alarm. Ide-
ally, we would like to extract exactly all triggered event flows.
However, knowing or quantifying if this goal is realized is prac-
tically very hard due to inherent limitations in finding the pre-
cise ground truth of event flows in real-world traffic traces. The
goal of anomaly extraction is to find a set of anomalous flows
coinciding with the event flows.
An anomaly detection system may provide meta-data rele-
vant to an alarm that help to narrow down the set of candi-
date anomalous flows. For example, anomaly detection systems
analyzing histograms may indicate the histogram bins that an
anomaly affected, e.g., a range of IP addresses or port numbers.
Such meta-data can be used to restrict the candidate anomalous
flows to these that have IP addresses or port numbers within the
affected range. In Table I, we outline useful meta-data provided
by some well-known anomaly detectors.
To extract anomalous flows, one could build a model de-
scribing normal flow characteristics and use the model to
identify deviating flows. However, building such a micro-
scopic model is very challenging due to the wide variability
of flow characteristics. Similarly, one could compare flows
during an interval with flows from normal or past intervals and
search for changes, like new flows that were not previously
observed or flows with significant increase/decrease in their
volume [16], [8]. Such approaches essentially perform anomaly
detection at the level of individual flows and could be used to
identify anomalous flows.
1063-6692/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE
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Fig. 2. Each detector supplies a set of suspicious flows .We filter the union
set of suspicious flows and apply association rule mining to extract the set
of anomalous flows .
TABLE I
USEFUL META-DATA PROVIDED BY VARIOUS ANOMALY DETECTORS. THE
LISTED META-DATA CAN BE USED TO IDENTIFY SUSPICIOUS FLOWS
C. Contributions
In this paper, we take an alternative approach to identify
anomalous flows that combines and consolidates information
from multiple histogram-based anomaly detectors. Compared
to other possible approaches, our method does not rely on past
data for normal intervals or normal models. Intuitively, each
histogram-based detector provides an additional view of net-
work traffic. A detector may raise an alarm for an interval and
provide a set of candidate anomalous flows. This is illustrated
in Fig. 2, where a set represents candidate flows supplied
by detector . We then use association rules to extract from
the union a summary of the anomalous flows . The
intuition for applying rule mining is the following: Anomalies
typically result in many flows with similar characteristics, e.g.,
common IP addresses or ports, since they have a common root
cause, like a network failure or a scripted denial-of-service
(DoS) attack. We test our anomaly extraction method on rich
network traffic data from a medium-sized backbone network.
The evaluation results show that our approach effectively
extracted the anomalous flows in all 31 analyzed cases and,
on average, triggered between 2 and 8.5 false positives, which
can be trivially filtered out by an administrator. In addition, our
solution reduced the classification cost in terms of items that
need to be manually classified by several orders of magnitude.
D. Outline
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
describes our techniques for extracting anomalous traffic from
flow traces using histogram-based detectors and association
rules. In Section III, we describe the datasets used for this study
Fig. 3. Overview of our approach to the anomaly extraction problem. The
figure illustrates how the meta-data for filtering flows is consolidated from
traffic features by taking the union and how suspicious flows are prefiltered
and anomalous flows are summarized in item-sets by association rule mining.
and present evaluation results. Related work is discussed in
Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes our paper.
II. METHODOLOGY
An overview of our approach to the anomaly extraction
problem is given in Fig. 3. A number of different his-
togram-based anomaly detectors monitor network traffic and
detect anomalies in an online fashion. Upon detecting an
anomaly, we use the union set of meta-data provided by the
detectors to prefilter a set of suspicious flows. This prefiltering
is necessary since it eliminates a large fraction of the normal
flows. A summary report of frequent item-sets in the set of
suspicious flows is generated by applying association rule
mining. The basic assumption behind this approach is that
frequent item-sets in the prefiltered data are often related to
the anomalous event. A large part of our evaluation results
is devoted to the verification of this assumption and shows
that this is indeed true. The entire anomaly extraction process
is automated and can take place both in a online and offline
fashion. In the online case, the anomaly detector triggers the
anomaly extraction process upon detecting an anomaly. In the
offline case, an administrator triggers the anomaly extraction
process to analyze anomaly alarms in a post-mortem fashion
and to determine their validity.
A. Flow Prefiltering
Assume a time interval with an anomaly. Prefiltering se-
lects all flows that match the union of the meta-data pro-
vided by detectors, i.e., all flows that match where
are filtered. Prefiltering usually removes a large part
of the normal traffic. This is desirable for two reasons. First,
it generates a substantially smaller dataset that results in faster
processing in the following steps. Second, it improves the ac-
curacy of association rule mining by removing flows that could
result in false-positive item-sets.
An important detail of our approach is that we keep flows
matching any of the meta-data instead of flows matching all
the meta-data. In other words, we take the union of the flows
matching meta-data rather than the intersection of the flows
matching meta-data. Taking the union is important because
identified meta-data can be flow-disjoint, meaning that they ap-
pear in different flows, in which case the intersection is empty.
For example, consider the Sasser worm that propagated in
multiple stages: Initially a large number of SYN flows scanned
target hosts, then additional flows attempted connections to
a backdoor on port 9996 of the vulnerable hosts, and finally
a third set of frequent flows resulted from downloading the
16-kB worm executable. In this example, an anomaly would
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likely be annotated with meta-data about the SYN flag, port
9996, and the specific flow size. The intersection of the flows
matching the meta-data would be empty, whereas the union
would include the anomalous flows. Anomalies often have a
multistage footprint, which highlights that taking the inter-
section of the flows would fail. A comparison between using
the union and the intersection for analyzing actual anomalies
can be found our previous work [3, Section 3.4]. It shows that
the union results in fewer false positives than the intersection,
which may entirely miss an anomaly.
B. Frequent Item-Set Mining
Association rules describe items that occur frequently to-
gether in a dataset and are widely used for market basket
analysis. For example, a rule might reflect that 98% of cus-
tomers that purchase tires also get automotive services [1].
Let be the set of all items in a market
basket and be the set of all transactions.
Each transaction contains a subset of items chosen from .
In association analysis, a collection of zero or more items is
called an item-set. If an item-set contains items, it is called an
-item-set [31].
The problem of discovering all association rules in a dataset
can be decomposed into two subproblems: 1) the main and most
challenging part is finding frequent item-sets, i.e., item-sets
that appears in more than a threshold number of transactions;
and 2) given the frequent item-sets, derive association rules.
The second part is trivial as a frequent item-set implies a
set of candidate association rules. For example, a frequent
item-set gives the candidate rules ,
, and . In this paper, we apply
the first step of association rule mining, i.e., we find frequent
item-sets to extract anomalous flows from a large set of flows
observed during a time interval. We do not compute corre-
sponding association rules as this second step does not provide
any additional information for the purpose of anomaly extrac-
tion. Our assumption for applying frequent item-set mining
to the anomaly extraction problem is that anomalies typically
result in a large number of flows with similar characteristics,
e.g., IP addresses, port numbers, or flow lengths, since they
have a common root cause like a network failure, a bot engine,
or a scripted DoS attack.
We map each flow record into a corresponding transaction .
The transaction width is defined as the number of items present
in a transaction. Each transaction has a width of seven since each
flow record has seven associated features corresponding to its
srcIP, dstIP, srcPort, dstPort, protocol, #packets, #bytes. For ex-
ample, the item refers to a source port
number equal to 80, while item refers
to a destination port number 80. By construction, a transaction
cannot have two items of the same feature type, e.g., two desti-
nation ports.
A transaction is said to contain an item-set if is a
subset of . An important property of an item-set is its support
count, which refers to the number of transactions (flow records)
that contain a particular item-set. For example, the support of the
2-item-set is equal
to the number of flow records that have the given destination IP
address and destination port.
Apriori Algorithm: The standard algorithm for discovering
frequent item-sets is the Apriori algorithm by Agrawal and
Srikant [1]. Apriori computes in each round the support for all
candidate -item-sets. At the end of each round, the -item-sets
with frequency above the minimum support parameter are
selected. The frequent item-sets of round are used in the next
round to construct candidate -item-sets. The algorithm
stops when no -item-sets with frequency above the
minimum support are found. In our setup, Apriori makes at
most seven passes over the dataset as each transaction (flow
record) has exactly seven features.
By default, Apriori outputs all frequent item-sets that it finds.
We modify this to output only maximal frequent item-sets, i.e.,
frequent -item-sets that are not a subset of a more specific fre-
quent -item-set. Maximal item-sets are desirable since
they significantly reduce the number of item-sets to process by
a human expert. The Apriori algorithm takes one parameter, i.e.,
the minimum support threshold, as input. If the minimum sup-
port is selected too small, many item-sets representing normal
flows (false positives) will be included in the output. On the
other hand, if the minimum support is selected too large, the
item-sets representing the anomalous flows might be missed
(false negatives).
Apriori Example: In the following, we give an example
of using Apriori to extract anomalies. For the purpose of this
example, we used a 15-min window of data extracted from
our traces (2 weeks long). In this trace, destination port 7000
was the only feature value that was flagged by our detectors.
It contributed 53 467 candidate anomalous flows. We forced
Apriori to artificially generate false-positive frequent item-sets
by manually adding to the candidate set flows that had
one of the three most frequent destination ports but had not
been flagged by our detector. In particular, the most popular
destination ports were port 80 that matched 252 069 flows,
port 9022 that matched 22 667 flows, and port 25 that matched
22 659 flows. Such frequent flow features can lead to false
positives if they go through our prefiltering process due to
collisions with anomalous features. In total, the input set
contained 350 872 flows. For our example, we set the minimum
support parameter to 10 000 flows and applied our modified
Apriori to the flow set .
The final output of the algorithm is given in Table II, which
lists a total of 15 frequent item-sets. In the first iteration, a total
of 60 frequent 1-item-sets were found. However, 58 of these
were removed from the output as subsets of at least one fre-
quent 2-item-set, i.e., these frequent item-sets were not max-
imal. In the second iteration, a total of 78 frequent 2-item-sets
were found. Again, 72 2-item-sets could be removed since they
were subsets of frequent 3-item-sets. In the third iteration, 41
frequent 3-item-sets were found, of which four item-sets were
not deleted from the output. In the fourth round, 10 frequent
4-item-sets were found, but only one of them remained after re-
moval of redundant 4-item-sets. Two frequent 5-item-sets were
found in round five. Finally, the algorithm terminated as no fre-
quent 6-item-set satisfying the minimum support was found.
Three out of the 15 frequent item-sets had destination port
7000. We verified that indeed several compromised hosts were
flooding the victim host E on destination port 7000. Regarding
the other frequent item-sets, we verified that hosts A, B, and C,
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TABLE II
FREQUENT ITEM-SETS COMPUTEDWITH OURMODIFIED APRIORI ALGORITHM. THE INPUT DATA SET CONTAINED 350 872 FLOWS, AND THEMINIMUM SUPPORT
PARAMETER WAS SET TO 10 000 FLOWS. IP ADDRESSES HAVE BEEN ANONYMIZED
which sent a lot of traffic on destination port 80, were HTTP
proxies or caches. The traffic on destination port 9022 (22 573
flows) was backscatter since each flow has a different source
IP address and a random source port number. This backscatter
anomaly was flagged by the detector in an earlier interval where
it had started. The remaining item-sets refer to combinations
of common destination ports and flow sizes and illustrate false
positives that we artificially added in this example for illustra-
tion. Such frequent features can lead to false positives if they go
through our prefiltering process. However, due to their frequent
nature, typically they can be easily identified and filtered our by
administrator. A key feature of our anomaly extraction is that
in addition to leading to a small number of false positives, as
we also discuss in the evaluation section, often it is possible to
easily spot and filter our false positives.
C. Histogram-Based Detector
Histogram-based anomaly detectors [14], [30], [20], [26],
have been shown to work well for detecting anomalous behavior
and changes in traffic distributions. We build a histogram-based
detector for our evaluation that uses the Kullback–Leibler (KL)
distance to detect anomalies. The KL distance has been success-
fully applied for anomaly detection in previous work [11], [26].
Each histogram detector monitors a flow feature distribution,
like the distribution of source ports or destination IP addresses.
We assume histogram-based detectors that correspond to
different traffic features and have each histogram bins.
Our approach for binning of feature values to histogram bins
will be described in the next section.
During time interval , an anomaly detection module con-
structs histograms for the number of flows per traffic feature. At
the end of each interval, it computes for each histogram the KL
distance between the distribution of the current interval and a
reference distribution. The KL distance measures the similarity
of a given discrete distribution to a reference distribution
and is defined as
Coinciding distributions have a KL distance of zero, while de-
viations in the distribution cause larger KL distance values. In
general, the KL distance is asymmetric .
Fig. 4. (top) KL distance time series for the source IP address feature for
roughly two days. (bottom) First difference of the KL distance for the same
period. The dashed line corresponds to the anomaly detection threshold.
Instead of training and recalibrating distributions that repre-
sent normal behavior, we use the distribution from the previous
measurement interval as reference distribution . Hence, wewill
observe a spike in the KL distance time series each time the flow
distribution changes. Assuming an anomalous event that spans
multiple intervals, the KL distance will generate spikes at the
beginning and at the end of an anomalous event. On the other
hand, changes in the total number of flows that do not have an
impact on the distribution will not result in large KL distance
values. The KL distance time series for the source IP address
feature over roughly two days is depicted in Fig. 4 in the upper
plot.
We have observed that the first difference of the KL dis-
tance time series is approximately normally distributed with
zeromean and standard deviation . This observation enables us
to derive a robust estimate, the median absolute deviation, of the
standard deviation and of the anomaly detection threshold
from a limited number of training intervals. We generate an alert
when
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Fig. 5. Iterative method for determining the anomalous bins. The KL distance
converges to zero as, in each round, the bin with the largest absolute difference
is aligned with its counterpart in the reference distribution. Already after the
first round, the KL distance decreases significantly.
In Fig. 4, we show the time series for the source
IP address feature and the corresponding threshold. We deliber-
ately use an one-sided threshold, i.e., an alarm is only generated
for positive spikes crossing the threshold, since positive spikes
correspond to a significant increase in the KL distance repre-
senting many additional similar flows whereas negative spikes
typically denote the end of an anomaly.
If an anomaly is detected during interval in the distribution
of traffic feature , we need to identify the set of affected
feature values, e.g., the IP addresses that have been targeted by
a denial-of-service attack. In a first step, we identify the set of
histogram bins contributing to the KL distance spike. Then,
in a second step, the corresponding feature values , e.g., the
DoS victim IPs, are identified. This two-step approach is taken
since typically a large number of feature values are aggregated
into a single bin.
In the first step, to find the contributing histogram bins, we
use an iterative algorithm that simulates the removal of suspi-
cious flows until falls below the detection threshold.
In each round, the algorithm selects the bin with the largest ab-
solute distance between the histogram of
the previous and current interval. The motivation here is that
anomalous flows, e.g., belonging to a denial-of-service attack,
will cause such a difference in flow counts for certain bins. The
removal of flows falling into bin is simulated by setting the
bin count in the current histogram equal to its value in the pre-
vious interval . The iterative process continues until
the “cleaned” histogram does not generate an alert any more.
This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 5, where we plot the KL
distance computed in each round. Already after the first round,
the KL distance decreases significantly.
Having identified the set of anomalous histogram bins by
simulation, we need to obtain the corresponding set of feature
values in the second step. This task is trivial if each bin con-
tains only a single feature value. However, such an approach is
not feasible with sparse traffic features like IP addresses, which
are typically used for anomaly detection. Our approach for iden-
tifying the corresponding feature values is explained in the next
section.
D. Histogram Cloning and Voting
Histogram binning typically groups in a rather ad hoc way
adjacent feature values, e.g., adjacent IP addresses, into a de-
sired number of bins. As an alternative to arbitrary binning, we
introduce histogram cloning. With histogram cloning, different
clones provide alternative ways to group feature values into a
desired number of bins/groups creating effectively additional
views along which an anomaly may be visible. The cloning
mechanism is coupled with a simple voting scheme that controls
the sensitivity of the detector and eventually affects a tradeoff
between false positives and negatives.
In particular, a histogram clone with bins uses a hash func-
tion to randomly place each traffic feature value into a bin. Each
histogram-based detector uses histogram clones
with independent hash functions.1 Upon detection of a disrup-
tion in the distribution, each clone compiles a list of traffic
feature values that are associated with the disruption by keeping
a map of bins and corresponding feature values. The advantage
of histogram cloning is that we obtain additional traffic views
that help us in identifying the correct feature values in each
anomalous bin using a voting scheme. In the short version [3]
of this work, we only keep feature values that have been iden-
tified by all histogram clones . We generalize this
approach to a more flexible scheme that is based on voting. In
particular, voting keeps a feature value if it has been selected
by at least out of clones. With this approach, the tradeoff
between false-positive and false-negative feature values can be
adjusted via the parameters and .
Typically, a histogram bin corresponds to a large number of
feature values, e.g., the 65K unique port numbers are distributed
evenly over 1024 bins if we use a 10-bit hash function for ran-
domization. Therefore the set of feature values identified by
each clone contains a large number normal feature values col-
liding on anomalous bins. Using the traffic views provided by
clones drastically reduces the probability that a normal
feature value appear in an anomalous bin in all of the clones.
Assume that each of the clones has detected a disruption
in the distribution of feature in interval and has identified
responsible bins. Therefore, each clone includes the anoma-
lous feature value in the set with probability . A distinct
normal feature value, on the other hand, is selected only if it col-
lides on one of the selected bins and thus has a selection proba-
bility of , where is the total number of bins.
If an anomalous value is included by one clone, it is likely
that it will also be included by the other clones as these events
are not independent. Consequently, we can derive a lower bound
for the probability that an anomalous feature value is included
by (out of ) or more clones
(1)
1Note that histogram cloning uses random projections as they are commonly
used in sketch data structures, e.g., [6], that have been proposed in the literature.
Sketches aim at summarizing a data stream in a compact data structure, which
can be used for answering various queries. In contrast, histogram cloning is a
method to randomly bin histograms that does not target summarization.
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TABLE III
PARAMETERS INCLUDING DESCRIPTION AND RANGE AS USED IN SECTION III
and an upper bound for the probability that an anomalous feature
value is missed
(2)
The probability that a normal feature value is included by or
more clones, on the other hand, is given by
(3)
Here, we do not derive a bound since the considered events are
not correlated.
To sum up, the meta-data for feature obtained after the
voting process contain feature values representing normal and
anomalous traffic. The ratio of normal and anomalous feature
values depends on the parameters and , on the initial proba-
bility , and the hash function length . The impact of these
parameters on the overall accuracy of our approach is analyzed
next.
E. Parameter Estimation
The various parameters associated with our approach, and
their range as used in the evaluation of this work, are summa-
rized in Table III. Although most of the parameters are associ-
ated with the detection part of our approach, some also impact
the extraction part. In the following, we describe each param-
eter in detail and discuss selection criteria.
Number of Detectors : In this paper, we use five detectors,
which correspond to five features that are frequently used for
network traffic anomaly detection: source IP addresses, desti-
nation IP addresses, source port numbers, destination port num-
bers, and number of packets per flow. In principle, if the com-
putational overhead is reasonable, which is the case with our
detector, more features are welcome since they provide addi-
tional views along which an anomaly may prevail. Other fea-
tures that can be useful for anomaly detection are the following:
the number of packets per flow, the average packet size, the du-
ration of a flow, the source/destination autonomous system (AS)
numbers, and the geographical distribution of IP addresses.
Interval Length : The interval length determines the de-
tectable anomaly scale, i.e., it becomes harder to detect short
disruptions that contain only few flows with longer intervals. On
the other hand, it is not always desirable to detect such short dis-
ruptions. Hence, the desired number of daily or weekly anoma-
lous alarms can be used to set the interval length . The desired
number of alarms depends on the available human resources for
investigating alarms. Some studies report that actionable alarms
require on average 60 min investigation time [25], which would
correspond to eight alarms per day assuming a full-time em-
ployee for analyzing alarms. Another issue related to the in-
terval length is the detection delay as an anomaly can only be
detected at the end of a given interval. Typically used intervals
correspond to delays of fewminutes, e.g., 5–15 min. However, a
sliding window mechanism can shorten this delay. Finally, one
last implication is that a larger results in more flows to be pro-
cessed by association rule mining and in higher computational
overhead. Nevertheless, the overhead of association rule mining
after prefiltering is relatively low as we discuss in Section III.
Hash Function Length : The hash function length is also
involved in a detection sensitivity versus aggregation tradeoff
as discussed for parameter . The smaller the hash function
length, the more flows are aggregated per hash function bin. In
addition, a larger is desired for anomaly extraction as it de-
creases the probability that a normal feature value remains
in the meta-data after voting and, thus, the number of candidate
flows for rule mining. Finally, the parameter also affects the re-
quired memory resources. Assuming that the available memory
resources do not drive the choice of , then an acceptable range
of values can be first determined via simulation using (3) and a
target range for . Then, should be selected together with
based on a desired number of daily/weekly anomalous alarms.
Among the possible choices realizing a desired number
of alarms, the solutions with larger , i.e., smaller bins, are
preferable for anomaly extraction.
Voting Parameters and : The parameter determines the
total number of histogram clones used. The computational re-
quirements in terms of memory and CPU scale linearly with .
Moreover, the parameter has an impact on the probability that
a feature value remains in the meta-data after voting, and thus
on accuracy. The parameter determines the lower bound for
the number of clones that need to select a feature value to be in-
cluded in the final meta-data. Therefore, can vary between 1,
corresponding to the union, and , representing the intersection.
Just like , the parameter impacts the number of flows selected
in the prefiltering step and thus the accuracy of our approach.
The parameter settings for and can also be obtained by sim-
ulation using (1) and (3). Simulation results for and for
different settings of and will be presented in Section III.
Minimum Support : The parameter determines the fre-
quency threshold above which an item-set is extracted by
Apriori as a possible set of anomalous flows. A large extracts
no or few item-sets, which in our experiments were almost
always associated with anomalous events. On the other hand,
decreasing results in more item-sets and in a small but higher
rate of false positives. The size of the top item-sets depends on
many factors, like the used interval length, the monitored link
rate(s), the type of filtering used, and the traffic mix among
others. A specific value for is unlikely to work in all cases.
The value of needs to be determined by trial and error. In
our evaluation of the number of false positives in Section III,
we have used a range between 3000 and 10 000 flows that
resulted in a small number of item-sets. In general, through
our extensive experimentation, we have learned that a suitable
is typically in the range between 1% and 10% of the total
number of input flows. Starting with a value within this range,
typically one can arrive to a suitable within a small number
of 2–3 trials. One possibility is to select a very low that will
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generate a large number of item-sets. Note that the generated
item-sets can be ranked by their frequency. Then, one can keep
only the top item-sets according to the frequency ranking. This
could include, for example, the top 10 or top 20 item-sets as
desired. The cost of a lower is more overhead for running
the algorithm. Alternatively, one can start with a high and
progressively decrease it until a sufficient number of anomalous
item-sets has been investigated.
In summary, the parameters and are the simplest as
should generally be large involving additional useful features
and should be low or variable. The parameters and are
mainly involved in a detection-sensitivity-versus-aggregation
tradeoff. This tradeoff should be settled based on the average
number of daily or weekly anomalous alarms. Having set this
tradeoff, then a large , i.e., smaller bins, is desired for anomaly
extraction, which should be balanced by a larger , i.e., 15 min
in our experiments, to achieve sufficient aggregation. Finally,
the parameters and serve to balance the number of false and
true positives produced by prefiltering. A range of acceptable
values can be determined by simulations using the discussed
analytical models.
III. EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe the traces we used for our
experiments, and then evaluate each step of our approach for
different parameter settings. In particular, we evaluate the accu-
racy of our approach, as well as the reduction in classification
cost, in terms of flows or item-sets.
A. Dataset and Ground Truth
To validate our approach, we used a Netflow trace coming
from one of the peering links of a medium-sized ISP
(SWITCH/AS559). SWITCH is a backbone operator con-
necting all Swiss universities and various research labs—e.g.,
CERN, IBM, PSI—to the Internet. We have been collecting
nonsampled and nonanonymized NetFlow traces from the
peering links of SWITCH since 2003. The SWITCH IP address
range contains approximately 2.2 million IP addresses. On
average, we see 92 million flows and 220 million packets per
hour crossing the peering link we used for our experiments. The
dataset used for this study was recorded during December 2007
and spans two continuous weeks.
To generate datasets for evaluating the Apriori algorithm, we
computed the KL distance time series for the two weeks of data
for the following feature distributions: source IP address, desti-
nation IP address, source port number, destination port number,
and flow size in packets. We manually identified 31 anomalous
intervals by visual inspection and top- queries on the data. To
determine the root cause of each anomaly, we extracted all flows
in an anomalous interval and analyzed the time series and dis-
tribution of the five features, the number of packets and bytes
per flow, the flow interarrival times, and the flow durations. We
found a total of 36 different events within the 31 the anoma-
lous intervals. The identified anomalies, their class, and the av-
erage number of flows per class are listed in Table IV. Deter-
mining the class of an anomaly is a complex manual process
that combines hints extracted from visual inspection, like tar-
geted ports or IP addresses, with the expertise of the analyst and
TABLE IV
IDENTIFIED ANOMALIES IN TWOWEEKS OF NETFLOW DATA SEPARATED BY
ANOMALY CLASS. FOR EACH CLASS, WEGIVE THENUMBER OF OCCURRENCES
AND THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF FLOWS CAUSED BY THIS CLASS OF ANOMALY
with knowledge about malware from forums and threat expert
reports to reason about the proper class of an anomaly. We clas-
sified anomalies based on a manual process into seven classes:
Flooding, Backscatter, Network Experiment, DDoS, Scanning,
Spam, and Unknown. Our class “Network Experiment” corre-
sponds to anomalies we traced to a PlanetLab node running in
our university. The “Spam” class corresponds to anomalies tar-
geting SMTP servers, while “Flooding” differs from a standard
“DDoS” in that it involves a small number of sources.
Subsequently, we computed the set of candidate anomalous
flows for each anomalous interval using our modified
Apriori algorithm. After applying Apriori, we manually ana-
lyzed the found frequent item-sets and identified true positives,
which matched the identified events, and false positives, which
matched benign traffic.
B. Accuracy of Histogram Clones
As a first step, we evaluated the detection accuracy of our
histogram-based detector for different values of the interval
length and the hash function length . We found small dif-
ferences in the detection results for equal to 512, 1024, and
2048. We also found that the number of detections decreases
with the interval length . In particular, setting to 1024 and
to 5, 10, and 15 min, we detected 62, 52, and 31 anomalous
intervals, respectively. Based on these numbers and the param-
eter selection guidelines we analyzed in Section II-E, we set
conservatively to 15 min, which corresponds to 2.2 alarms per
day, and to 1024.
To assess the detection accuracy, we used receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve analysis. We computed the number
of false positives, i.e., intervals that have an alarm but are not in
the ground truth set, and true positives, i.e., intervals that are in
the ground truth set and have an alarm. An ROC curve plots the
false positive rate (FPR), the ratio between the number of false
positives and the total number of intervals that are not in the
ground truth set, versus the true positive rate (TPR), the ratio
between the number of true positives and the total number of
intervals with an alarm. Different points in the ROC space are
obtained by varying the detection threshold.
In Fig. 6, we plot ROC curves for three histogram clones, i.e.,
using three different hash functions. A detection rate of 0.8 cor-
responds to a false positive rate of 0.03, while a detection rate of
1 (100%) to a false positive rate between 0.05 and 0.08 for dif-
ferent clones. With a false positive rate as low as 0.01, only 40%
of the anomalies are detected. These results are a lower bound
on the performance of our detector. This is because some of
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Fig. 6. ROC curves plotting the false positive rate versus the true positive
rate for different thresholds. The three curves correspond to different histogram
clones.
Fig. 7. Upper bound for the probability that an anomalous feature value is
eliminated by voting for different values of and in logarithmic scale. The
results for are marked for better readability. For a given value
of increases with , e.g., for and , we obtain ,
while for and , the probability increases to .
the false-positive intervals might contain unknown anomalous
traffic.
C. Impact of Voting
After the correct interval has been determined, each clone se-
lects histogram bins that are suspected to contain anomalous
flows. The number of responsible bins is determined by the de-
tection threshold and the nature of the anomaly, i.e., whether it is
distributed over many feature values or concentrated on a single
or few feature values. The probability that a clone correctly
identifies an anomalous feature value is equal to the probability
that an anomalous feature value has caused the disruption in the
histogram and the disruption has been detected.
We analyze the impact of voting using simulations. Each
clone includes an anomalous feature value in the set with
probability , while a normal feature value is selected only if it
collides on one of the selected bins with probability .
For simulating the impact of different voting strategies on the
error probabilities according to (1) and (3), we set ,
corresponding to a false positive rate of approximately 0.03
and varied in the range [1, 25].
In Fig. 7, the upper bound for the probability that an
anomalous feature value is missed is plotted for different values
of and in logarithmic scale. The results for and
Fig. 8. Probability that a normal feature value is not eliminated by voting
for different values of and in logarithmic scale. The number of anomalous
bins is (a) and (b) , and the number of total bins is .
are marked for better readability. For a given value of , in-
creases with , e.g., for and , we obtain ,
while for and the probability increases to
. Consequently, the upper bound for a fixed number
of histogram clones increases with the number of clones that
are required to agree on a feature value. In particular, it has its
minimum for and is maximized for .
In Fig. 8(a) and (b), we plot the probability that a normal
feature value is not eliminated by voting for different values of
and in logarithmic scale. The number of selected bins is
and , respectively. The number of total bins is
for both plots. The results for and are marked for
better readability. For a given value of decreases with ,
e.g., for and , the probability for including a normal
feature value is for and for .
For and , the probability decreases to
for , and to for . Moreover, we ob-
serve that the probability of including a normal feature value in
the meta-data increases dramatically with the number of anoma-
lous bins . Consequently, assuming a fixed setting of the voting
parameters, we have to tolerate higher false positive rates for
anomalies affecting multiple bins, e.g., distributed anomalies.
Alternatively, the parameter could be adapted based on the
estimated number of bins to achieve a target probability .
The average number of false-positive feature values can be de-
termined by multiplication of with the average number of
feature values observed within one interval, e.g., between 1 and
65 536 for port numbers.
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The simulation results show that a variety of operating
points can be achieved by setting the voting param-
eters appropriately. The selection of the parameters and
can be further optimized taking into account the induced
accuracy and overhead in the rule mining step. The essential
questions to answer are the following: 1) how is the accuracy
impacted by the number of normal feature values included in
the meta-data that is used for prefiltering the candidate flows;
and 2) how does the rule mining performance decrease with the
number of candidate flows?
D. Accuracy of Frequent Item-Set Mining
After the meta-data has been identified by voting, the cor-
responding flows are filtered and subsequently processed by
the item-set mining process. The accuracy in terms of correctly
identified item-sets depends on the following: the accuracy of
the meta-data used for per-filtering flows, the frequency of the
prefiltered normal and anomalous flows, and the minimum sup-
port parameter .
An interesting question concerning the accuracy of meta-data
is the following: What is the probability that a normal value in
the meta-data results in a false positive item-set? Recall that an
item-set will be generated if more than flows matching the
meta-data have one (1-item-set) or more ( -item-set) common
feature values. We have observed that the probability for gen-
erating a false positive item-set from a normal feature value is
highly skewed. For example, if port number 80 is included in the
meta-data, it is likely thatWeb servers with high loadwill appear
as false positive 2-item-sets in the output of Apriori. Neverthe-
less, they will be easy to identify as such. On the other hand,
if other less frequent port numbers are chosen, few flows will
match the feature value, and no false positive item-set will be
generated.
To further study the item-set mining accuracy, we used the
flow data of the 31 anomalous intervals. To generate the input
data sets for Apriori, we set to 3, to 3, and to 1024. This
corresponds to and for . Despite
the large value for , none of the 31 anomalies were missed.
This illustrates the fact that is an upper bound that was de-
rived under the assumption of independence between clones.
On the other hand, as is very low, only few normal feature
values are included in the meta-data.
For 21 anomalous intervals (70%), we obtained no FP
item-sets at all. The number of FP item-sets for the remaining
10 anomalous intervals is plotted in Fig. 9 together with the
average number of FP item-sets over all 31 anomalous intervals
(marked with squares). The number of FP item-sets decreases
with the minimum support since less FP item-sets satisfy the
minimum support condition. Fig. 9 shows that on average
between 2 and 8.5 FP item-sets are generated for minimum
support values between 3000 and 10 000 flows, respectively.
The top three lines in the figure correspond to anomalies with
higher numbers of FP item-sets. The observed FP item-sets
are exclusively caused by common feature values such as
ports, e.g., port 80, or short flow lengths. Hence, if an anomaly
happens to involve such a common feature value, the number
of FP item-sets automatically increases even if no normal
feature values are included in the meta-data. However, most of
Fig. 9. Number of false positive (FP) item-sets generated by Apriori for dif-
ferent minimum support parameter values for 10 anomalous intervals (30%).
For 21 anomalous intervals (70%), we obtain no FP item-sets at all. The av-
erage FP item-set count over all 31 anomalous intervals is marked with squares.
the FP item-sets can be sorted out rather easily by a network
administrator.
An important question is which types of anomalies are cap-
tured with our item-set mining approach. There are two require-
ments for extracting an anomaly. The anomaly should: 1) be
detected by causing a deviation in a traffic feature distribution;
and 2) trigger a large number of flows with similar characteris-
tics. For many anomalies that originate from or are directed to
a single or few IP addresses, these requirements are met. Scan-
ning, flooding, and spamming activity, (distributed) denial-of-
service attacks, as well as related backscatter can be identified
by frequent item-sets. Although the item-set mining approach
is not targeted at botnet detection, anomalous activities such
as spamming, scanning, or flooding are often caused by com-
promised hosts. Other anomalies may not be concentrated on a
single or few IP addresses like network outages, routing anoma-
lies, or distributed scanning. However, distributed scanning ac-
tivity typically has a common destination port and often a fixed
flow length that will appear as a frequent item-set. Anomalies
that affect certain network ranges, such as outages or routing
anomalies can be either captured by using IP address prefixes as
additional dimensions for item-set mining, or by applying con-
cepts from the hierarchical heavy-hitter detection domain [7].
E. Computational Overhead
The computational cost for updating histograms and for com-
puting the KL-distance is linear to the number of histogram
bins. The memory cost is also quite low. For example, 5 detec-
tors with 3 clones and 1024 histogram bins require 472 kB of
memory. The iterative method for determining anomalous bins
converges fairly fast as shown in Fig. 5 and only needs to be
executed when an anomaly is found. Frequent item-set mining
is the most demanding step of our methodology both in terms
of running time andmemory overhead. The exact computational
overhead of Apriori depends highly on the implementation used.
Progressive implementations that use FP-trees and database par-
tition techniques [15] have been shown to outperform standard
hash tree implementations [1]. Nevertheless, for all implemen-
tations, the computational overhead increases with the number
of transactions and the number of frequent 1-item-sets. Since
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Fig. 10. Average decrease in classification cost versus minimum support.
both the number of transactions and the number of frequent
1-item-sets increase as more normal flows are included in the
input data set, the performance of Apriori will decrease with the
size of the input data set, e.g., whenwe lower the threshold of the
histogram-based detectors or do not use meta-data at all. More-
over, some implementations show considerably longer compu-
tation times as the relative minimum support decreases [15],
which is equivalent to increasing the dataset size and keeping
the absolute minimum support constant. For our experiments,
we used an unoptimized implementation of Apriori in Python.
Even with the unoptimized implementation, we were able to
find frequent item-sets within reasonable time: In the worst case,
the algorithm required 5 min to compute frequent item-sets on
a Dual Core AMD Opteron 275 processor. A large number of
frequent item-set mining algorithms with better computational
efficiently than Apriori have been proposed in the literature. A
survey of findings can be found in [12]. We believe that it is pos-
sible to substantially optimize the computational overhead of
our implementation. However, such optimization goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
F. Decrease in Classification Cost
As a result of our approach, we obtain a summarized view
that is based on frequent item-sets instead of flows. Hence, the
problem of manually classifying flows can be reduced to the
problem of classifying item-sets. To quantify this decrease in
classification cost, we assume that the classification cost is a
linear function of the number of items that need to be classified.
Accordingly, we define the reduction in classification cost for
a given dataset as , where denotes the number
of flows in the flagged interval and the number of item-sets
in the output of Apriori. The number of flows in 15-min inter-
vals ranges between 700 000 and 2.6 million flows. Since the
cardinality of depends on the minimum support parameter,
we plot in Fig. 10 the reduction in classification cost for dif-
ferent values of the minimum support parameter. The average
cost reduction increases with the minimum support and ranges
between 600 000 and 800 000. The cost reduction saturates for
larger minimum support parameters as the minimum number
of item-sets is reached. This result illustrates that association
rule mining can greatly simplify root-cause analysis and attack
mitigation.
IV. RELATED WORK
A short version of our work has previously appeared in [3].
Most related to our work, Silveira and Diot [28] recently
introduced a tool called URCA that searches for anomalous
flows by iteratively eliminating subsets of normal flows. URCA
also classifies the type of a detected anomaly. Nevertheless, it
requires to repeatedly evaluate an anomaly detector on different
flow subsets, which can be costly. Compared to this work, we
show that simply computing frequent item-sets on prefiltered
flows is sufficient to identify anomalous flows. DoWitcher [27]
is a scalable system for worm detection and containment in
backbone networks. Part of the system automatically constructs
a flow-filter mask from the intersection of suspicious attributes
(meta-data) provided by different detectors. We also leverage
suspicious attributes from an anomaly detector and study the
anomaly extraction problem in more depth. We highlight that
using the intersection can miss anomalous flows and find that
the union of the meta-data combined with association rule
mining gives better results. Dewaele et al. [9] use sketches
to create multiple random projections of a traffic trace, then
model the marginals of the subtraces using Gamma laws
and identify deviations in the parameters of the models as
anomalies. In addition, their method finds possible anomalous
source or destination IP addresses by taking the intersection
of the addresses hashing into anomalous subtraces. Compared
to this work, we introduce and validate techniques to address
the more challenging problem of finding anomalous flows
rather than IP addresses. Lakhina et al. [17] use SNMP data
to detect network-wide volume anomalies and to pinpoint the
origin–destination (OD) flow along which an anomaly existed.
In contrast, our approach takes as input a large number of flow
records, e.g., standard 5-tuple flows, and extracts anomalous
flows. An OD flow may include millions of both normal and
anomalous 5-tuple flows and, therefore, can form the input
to our methodology. Li et al. [20], use sketches to randomly
aggregate flows as an alternative to OD aggregation. The au-
thors show that random aggregation can detect more anomalies
than OD aggregation in the PCA subspace anomaly detection
method [18]. In addition, the authors discuss how their method
can be used for anomaly extraction. However, the work and
evaluation focus primarily on anomaly detection.
Association rules have been successfully applied to different
problems on networking. Lee and Stolfo [19] show how asso-
ciation rules can be used to extract interesting intrusion pat-
terns from system calls and tcpdump logs. Vaarandi [32] intro-
duces a tool called LogHound that provides an optimized im-
plementation of Apriori and demonstrates how LogHound can
be used to summarize traffic flow records. Yoshida et al. [34]
also use frequent item-set mining to identify interesting events
in traces from the MAWI traffic archive [23]. Li and Deng [21]
outline a variant of the Eclat frequent item-set mining algo-
rithm [35] that operates in a sliding window fashion and eval-
uate it using traffic flow traces from a Chinese university. Chan-
dola and Kumar [5] describe heuristics for finding a minimal set
of frequent item-sets that summarizes a large set of flows. Ma-
honey and Chan [22] use association rule mining to find rare
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events that are suspected to represent anomalies in packet pay-
load data. They evaluate their method on the 1999 DARPA/Lin-
coln Laboratory traces [24]. Their approach targets edge net-
works where mining rare events is possible. In massive back-
bone data, however, this approach is less promising. Another
application of rule mining in edge networks is eXpose [13],
which learns fine-grained communication rules by exploiting
the temporal correlation between flows within very short time
windows. Compared to these studies, we show how association
rule mining can be combined with anomaly detection to effec-
tively extract anomalous flows.
Hierarchical heavy-hitter detection methods [10], [36], [7]
group traffic into hierarchical clusters of high resource con-
sumption and focus primarily on optimizing computational per-
formance for summarizing normal traffic. For example, they
have been used to identify clusters of Web servers in hosting
farms. Hierarchical heavy-hitter detection is similar to frequent
item-set mining in that both approaches find different forms of
multidimensional heavy hitters. Compared to these studies, we
learn that intelligently combining multidimensional heavy-hit-
ters with anomaly detection enables us to extract anomalous
flows. In addition, frequent item-set mining scales to higher di-
mensionsmuch better than existing hierarchical heavy-hitter de-
tection methods.
Finally, substantial work has focused on dimensionality re-
duction for anomaly detection in backbone networks [2], [29],
[33], [18], [11], [4], [14]. These papers investigate techniques
and appropriate metrics for detecting traffic anomalies, but do
not focus on the anomaly extraction problem we address in this
paper.
V. CONCLUSION
Anomaly extraction takes as input a large set of flows and
aims at finding the flows associated with the event(s) that trig-
gered an observed anomaly. It is very useful for finding the root
cause of detected anomalies, which helps in anomaly mitiga-
tion, network forensics, and anomaly modeling. In this paper,
we first introduced a histogram-based detector that provides
fine-grained meta-data for filtering suspect flows. Furthermore,
we introduced a method for extracting and summarizing anoma-
lous flows. Our methodmodels flows as transactions and applies
frequent item-set mining to find large sets of flowswith identical
values in one or more features. Using real anomalies and traffic
traces from a medium-sized backbone network, we showed em-
pirically that the extracted frequent item-sets pinpoint the root
cause of the anomalies in all (31) studied cases. In addition, fre-
quent item-set mining produced very few false positives, which
could be trivially filtered out by an administrator. The presented
anomaly extraction approach is generic and can be used with
different anomaly detectors that provide meta-data about identi-
fied anomalies. It reduces the work-hours needed for the manual
verification of anomaly alarms.
A number of possible directions for future research exist.
Optimizing the scalability and efficiency of frequent item-set
mining for dealing with big network traffic data including
stream processing is one open problem. Association rule
mining is likely the most well-studied data mining problem
with a very large number of variants of the Apriori algorithm.
Mining top- item-sets; mining closed or maximal frequent
item-sets; and mining on multilevel, multidimensional, or
quantitative features are possible extensions to our work that
could provide useful additional features for network traffic
monitoring.
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